Affidavit: Healthcare and the Law - Antitrust Enforcement Update: Options for Struggling Hospitals

Contributor: Sean McConnell
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Merging hospitals or health systems often defend an otherwise potentially anti-competitive merger by arguing that the acquired hospital or health system is failing financially or is so financially weak that it would not be an effective competitor in the near future such that the merger is only a means for maintaining competition. While courts, the Federal Trade Commission (FTC), and the Department of Justice Antitrust Division (DOJ) recognize this potential defense, it has been nearly impossible for merging parties to prove and has been rarely successful in merger litigation. Perhaps, in light of this fact, over a dozen states have enacted laws allowing Certificates of Public Advantage (COPA) shielding hospital mergers from antitrust scrutiny.

What is the Failing or Flailing Firm Defense in Merger Litigation?

Under the recently updated Merger Guidelines, to meet the “failing firm” defense, a hospital must prove a “grave probability” of failure and “dim or nonexistent” reorganization prospects and that the acquiring hospital is the “only available purchaser.” 1  A merging hospital raising a failing firm defense must establish that the acquired hospital: (i) cannot meet its financial obligations in the near future; (ii) has been unable to successfully reorganize under the bankruptcy laws; and (iii) has not been able to obtain reasonable alternative acquisition offers, despite good faith efforts. In the alternative, merging hospitals often argue that even if the acquired entity does not meet the rigorous “failing firm” determination, the acquired hospital is so weakened financially as to be considered a “flailing firm” such that it lessens or negates any anti-competitive harm from the acquisition.

Over a decade ago, both the failing firm and the flailing firm defenses were rejected in litigation involving the merger of ProMedica Health System, Inc. (“ProMedica”) and St. Luke’s Hospital (“St. Luke’s”) in Toledo, Ohio. ProMedica argued that St. Luke’s would have had to cut services to stay independent and that its weakened financial performance would have prevented it from making necessary capital improvements to compete effectively. While the court agreed that St. Luke’s was struggling financially, it found that its losses had been declining and its cash flow improving at the time of the merger. 2 The Commission concluded that even though St. Luke’s consistently lost money, it was raising its patient volume and taking market share from ProMedica leading up to the acquisition. 3 The Sixth Circuit agreed with the lower court and the Commission that St. Luke’s poor financial status could not justify permitting the merger.4

In light of ProMedica, merging firms struggled to establish a failing firm defense to an otherwise anti-competitive merger. The failing firm defense showed signs of life, however, in FTC v. Community Health Systems Inc. & Novant Health Inc., No. 5:24-cv-0028 (W.D.N.C.).5 Earlier this year, the U.S. District Court for the Western District of North Carolina denied the FTC’s motion to enjoin Novant Health Inc.’s $320 million acquisition from Community Health Systems Inc. (CHS) of two hospitals in the Lake Norman area north of Charlotte, North Carolina. Had the decision stood, it would have been only the second time the FTC lost a hospital merger challenge in the last decade, with the other being the U.S. District Court for the Eastern District of Philadelphia refusing to enjoin the merger of Thomas Jefferson University and Albert Einstein Healthcare Network.6 More importantly, it would have provided grounds for other struggling hospitals to raise the failing firm defense in antitrust enforcement actions.

In Novant Health, the district court found that the acquisition would result in market shares and market concentration that would trigger a presumption that the acquisition would have anti-competitive effects; however, it found the two hospitals that Novant intended to acquire from CHS were struggling finically such that the acquisition would increase competition and satisfying the failing firm defense. The FTC immediately appealed the decision to the Fourth Circuit, and the Fourth Circuit quickly returned a decision in favor of the FTC granting its motion and enjoining Novant Health’s acquisition.7 The majority opinion provided no rationale for its decision; however, Judge Wilkinson voted to deny the FTC’s motion on grounds the district court’s findings regarding the viability of the hospitals at issue was not clearly erroneous.8 In light of the injunction, Novant and CHS thereafter abandoned the transaction, and the FTC successfully moved the Fourth Circuit to vacate the district court’s decision, which effectively frustrates any other struggling hospitals from citing the district court’s opinion as a potential path to surviving an antitrust challenge.

Do COPA Laws Provide a Lifeline to Struggling Hospitals?

COPA laws allow states to grant antitrust immunity to hospital mergers that federal regulators may otherwise consider anti-competitive. Currently, 19 states have COPA laws that allow state oversight over hospital mergers to protect competition; however, Pennsylvania, New Jersey, and Delaware do not. Last year, a federal court in Louisiana ruled the state’s COPA law shielded the merging parties from federal antitrust law under the state action doctrine.9 In other words, the FTC would not be able to bring an enforcement action to challenge the transaction. The FTC decided not to appeal that decision, perhaps, because it was worried the Fifth Circuit would further solidify a decision that the FTC opposes.

In any event, the FTC is likely to continue to be aggressive in its hospital enforcement efforts, and merging hospitals should be aware of this developing enforcement landscape.

Contact Sean at: [email protected]

Disclaimer: This article has been prepared and published for informational purposes only and is not offered, nor should be construed, as legal advice.

 

References

  1. U.S. Dep’t of Justice & Fed. Trade Comm’n., Merger Guidelines § 3.1 (2023).
  2. ProMedica Health Sys., Inc. v. Fed. Trade Comm’n, 749 F.3d 559 (6th Cir. 2014)
  3. In the Matter of ProMedica Health Sys., Inc., Docket No. 9346, p. 29 (FTC June 25, 2012)
  4. ProMedica Health Sys. v. Fed. Trade Comm’n, 749 F.3d 559 (6th Cir. 2014).
  5. 2024 WL 2854690, vacated by Fed. Trade Comm’n v. Novant Health, Inc., 2024 WL 3561941 (4th Cir. July 24, 2024).
  6. Fed. Trade Comm’n v. Thomas Jefferson Univ., et. al., 505 F. Supp. 3d 522 (E.D. Pa. 2020) (finding that FTC’s proposed general acute care services market failed to include numerous health systems and hospitals in the relevant geographic market).
  7. Fed. Trade Comm’n v. Novant Health, Inc., 2024 WL 3042896 (4th Cir. June 18, 2024).
  8. Id.
  9. Louisiana Children’s Med. Ctr. v. Attorney General of the United States, et al., No. 23-1305, 2023 WL 6293887 (E.D. La. Sept. 27, 2023).